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MICHIGAN COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
ACT FOR ESSENTIAL SERVICES
I. Introduction
When Public Act 312 became effective on October 1, 1969,
Michigan joined Rhode Island and Pennsylvania in permitting
compulsory arbitration of unresolved labor disputes involving
municipal police and firemen.' Wyoming similarly provides for
compulsory arbitration in fire department disputes. 2 Passage of
the Act was prompted by a desire to avoid the dire consequences
of strikes or work stoppages by firefighters and policemen, 3 and to
provide a method by which the bargaining power of public service
unions could be maintained in the absence of the strike privilege.
4
Since Michigan had barred strikes by public employees in 1947,
5
the unions felt that they lacked a base of power from which to
press their demands. The firemen and policemen realized that a
strike, aside from its illegality, would, in all likelihood, alienate
employer and legislators alike without advancing the cause for
which they were striking. The unions representing these groups
'MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 423.231-247 (1969). R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.1-(1-14)
(1961) as amended by Pub. L. 1968 ch. 150, § 1, 2 and § 28-9.2-(1-14) (1963) as
amended by Pub. L. 1968, ch. 151 § 1, 2 effective June 4, 1968. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 217.1-10 (1968).
2Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-265 thru 273 (1965).
3 The seriousness of such strikes was vividly demonstrated when Gary, Indiana's
firefighters stood idle as a large lumber yard burned to the ground during their August
5-10, 1969 strike. N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1969, at 23, col. I. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11,
1969, at 70, col,5.
4 Shenton, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Service, 17 LAB. L.J. 138 (1966).
5 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.202, (1967):
No person holding a position by appointment or employ-
ment in the government of the state of Michigan, or in
the government of any one or more of the political subdi-
visions thereof, or in the public school service, or in any
public or special district, or in the service of any author-
ity, commission, or board, or in any other branch of the
public service, hereinafter called a 'public employee'
shall strike.
It was determined that strikes by public employees may be enjoined in School
District v. Holland Educ. Ass'n., 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968). Firing or
discipline was provided for striking public employees in MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 423.206 (1967).
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feared that the probable result would be more oppressive sanc-
tions for strikes by policemen and firemen. As a result, com-
pulsory arbitration was advanced as a compromise to compensate
them for the loss of their right to strike.
The recommendation for compulsory binding arbitration of dis-
putes involving firemen and policemen originated in a committee
appointed by former Governor George Romney6 to examine,
among other things, means of "protecting the general public
against interruptions or impairment of essential government ser-
vices." 7 As a result of this study, compulsory arbitration was
initiated on an experimental basis for a period commencing Octo-
ber 1, 1969, and expiring June 30, 1972.
II. Structure of the Act
Public Act 312 provides the unions with an alternative course
of action in the event of unsatisfactory collective bargaining and
mediation. Rather than engaging in an illegal strike with its poten-
tially disastrous consequences, the union may initiate compulsory
arbitration when the employer has rejected the good faith de-
mands of the union and the parties are at impasse.
Under the Act, whenever a dispute involving policemen or
firemen has not been resolved within thirty days of its submission
to mediation and fact finding, either party may initiate binding
arbitration proceedings by a prompt request in writing to the
other.8 Each party then has ten days to select an appropriate
delegate for the arbitration panel. These two arbitrators choose a
third arbitrator to act as chairman of the panel. If the two selected
arbitrators are unable to agree on a third within five days, either
of them may request the chairman of the state mediation board to
appoint the third arbitrator. This appointment must be made with-
in seven days of the request.
Within fifteen days after his appointment, the chairman is re-
quired to hold a hearing. Third parties may be granted leave to
6 The members of the committee were: Russell A. Smith, chairman; Gabriel N. Alexander;
Edward L. Cushman; Ronald W. Houghton; Charles C. Killingsworth.
7Governor Romney's letter of July 29, 1966, at 1-2 of App. A to ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, REPORT OF GOVERNOR
GEORGE ROMNEY (as reported in GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT
(GERR) ), No. 181, F-I at F-7 to F-8.
8 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.233 (1969). The statutory references for this note are found in
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 423.231-247 (1969).
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intervene at this point upon a showing of substantial interest.9
The expense of the proceedings shall be borne equally by each of
the parties to the dispute and by the state. Unless the parties
agree otherwise, the hearings are to be concluded within thirty
days.
The proceedings are to be conducted informally with a suspen-
sion of the technical rules of evidence. To facilitate examination
and resolution of the dispute, any oral or documentary evidence
and any other data deemed relevant by the arbitration panel may
be received in evidence. The panel has authority to administer
oaths, require attendance of witnesses and order the production
of relevant papers, contracts, agreements and documents. If nec-
essary, subpoenas may be issued to enforce these powers. If any
person refuses to obey a subpoena or to be sworn or to testify, or
if anyone present at the hearing is guilty of contempt, the arbi-
tration panel or the Attorney General, if requested, may call upon
the circuit court to issue an appropriate order.
The arbitration panel is to base its findings, opinions, and
orders upon the following factors: the lawful authority of the
employer; stipulations of the parties; the interests and welfare of
the public and the financial ability of the unit of government to
meet those costs; comparison of wages, hours and conditions of
similar employees in comparable communities in both the private
and public sectors; the cost of living; the overall total com-
pensation now received by the employees; changes in the fore-
going circumstances arising during arbitration; and "other fac-
tors," normally considered in collective bargaining and arbi-
tration. 10
If supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence
on the whole record, a majority decision of the panel shall be final
and binding. Either party or the panel itself may have the decision
enforced in the circuit court for the county where the dispute
arose or where the majority of the affected employees reside. 1 If
'MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 423.236 (1969). "Upon application and for good cause shown, and
upon such terms and conditions as are just, a person, labor organization, or govern-
mental unit having a substantial interest therein may be granted leave to intervene by
the arbitration panel."
10 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 423.239 (1969).
11 The orders of the panel are not self-executing. Thus, if one of the parties refuses to
accept the result of the arbitration proceeding, the other party may procure an
enforcement order from the circuit court in the county where the dispute arose.
MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 423.240 (1969).
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either party willfully disobeys or encourages resistance to the
order of the circuit court, a fine not exceeding $250 per day may
be assessed for each day of continuing violation.
12
The orders of the arbitration panel are reviewable by this same
circuit court if:
... the arbitration panel was without or ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction; the order is unsup-
ported by competent, material and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or the order
was procured by fraud, collusion or other
similar and unlawful means.13
Notwithstanding the pendency of judicial review, the order of the
panel remains in effect until upset.
During the pendency of proceedings, the parties by agreement
may alter the wages, hours and conditions of employment with-
out prejudicing their positions. Anytime after the award, the par-
ties, by stipulation, may amend or modify an award of arbitration.
Ill. Evaluation of the Act
Michigan's Public Act 312 of 1969 does not guarantee that
labor disputes involving firemen and policemen will result in arbi-
tration if they are not resolved within thirty days of their submis-
sion to mediation. While the statute ostensibly provides for "com-
pulsory arbitration of labor disputes in municipal police and fire
departments, ' 14 arbitration is not, in fact, compulsory. The Act
simply provides that, in the event of an unresolved dispute, either
party "may initiate binding arbitration proceedings- 15 [Emphasis
added]. Unless one party desires to submit to arbitration, the Act
provides no relief at all. In contrast, the provisions of the Rhode
Island and Wyoming statutes require that "any and all unresolved
issues shall be submitted to arbitration ' ' 16 [Emphasis added]. This
12 This is a noteworthy increase in the severity of contempt sanctions under Michigan law.
The usual penalty for contempt is a maximum $250 fine or 30 days' imprisonment, or
both. MICH. COMp. LAWS § 600.1715 (1967).
13 MICH. COMp. LAWS § 423.242 (1969).
14 MICH. CoMp. LAWS foreword to §§ 423.231-247 (1969).
15 MICH. COMp. LAWS § 423.233 (1969).
'8 R.l. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.1-6 (1961) & § 28-9.1-7 (1963); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-269
(1965), Pennsylvania, like Michigan, does not make arbitration mandatory after 30
days of mediation, but at this time either party "may request the appointment of a
board of arbitration." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.4(a) (1968).
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distinction, however, is of limited practical import. If arbitration
is available, it is doubtful that any city would allow policemen and
firemen to strike. On the other hand, in making compulsory arbi-
tration optional, the Act encourages collective bargaining. If the
parties are near agreement in mediation and desire to continue
discussion without resorting to arbitration, they may do so even
though the thirty day mediation period has expired. If either party
should request arbitration, however, the other party's participa-
tion is compulsory, and arbitration necessarily follows. In either
case, it would appear that the Act provides an effective means of
avoiding illegal and potentially dangerous stoppages of essential
services while affording the unions some degree of leverage in
their collective bargaining efforts.
17
Unfortunately, the Act contains numerous ambiguities as yet
unresolved. It is unclear, for example, whether mediation and
fact-finding are necessary prerequisites to the submission of the
dispute to arbitration. The Act states that "[wihenever in the
course of mediation . . . the dispute has not been re-
solved.., within 30 days of the submission of the dispute to
mediation and fact-finding," either party may request arbi-
tration.' 8 This provision seemingly requires that the parties must
submit their dispute to mediation and fact-finding before seeking
arbitration. Subsequently, however, it is stated that the Act is
supplementary to Act No. 336 of the Public Acts of 1947 as
amended 19 and does not amend or repeal any of its provisions.
20
According to Public Act 312, "any provisions [of Act No. 3361
requiring fact-finding procedures shall be inapplicable to disputes
subject to arbitration under this act."' 2 ' Thus the Act appears not
to require fact-finding, despite some language to the contrary. If
the Act establishes mediation alone as a prerequisite to arbi-
17 However, the availability of arbitration does not guarantee that the essential services
will be free from strike activities. For example on October 7, 1969, 3,700 policemen
and 2,400 firemen walked off their jobs in Montreal, Quebec after learning of the
wage award granted them by an arbitration board. In their one day absence, arson
and looting were widespread, one policeman was killed and ten banks were robbed.
The firemen and policemen were reacting to the arbitration board's binding decision
which left their wages below Toronto's scale. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1969, at col. 1.
1s MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 423.233 (1969).
19 MIcH. COMP. LAWS §§ 423.201-216 (1967).
2 0 




tration, this pre-arbitration procedure should have been made
explicit.
The nature of the disputes which may be submitted to arbi-
tration under the Act also remains unclear. The Act speaks of
labor disputes generally, and does not limit the application of the
Act to interest (contract terms) disputes alone. Since the Act is,
by its own terms, to be "liberally construed," 22 it appears that the
Act may well be equally applicable to grievance disputes under an
existing contract.
23
The Act also fails to provide explicit standards governing inter-
vention by interested third parties. Persons, labor organizations
and governmental units may intervene on "such terms and condi-
tions as are just" and for good cause shown. 24 In all likelihood,
the usual standards governing intervention in civil cases will be
adopted under this Act, although this is by no means made
clear. 2
5
A further problem may arise when the hearing has been con-
cluded and the neutral arbitrator is called upon to join with one
party or the other to formulate a majority ruling. If both parties
maintain positions basically unacceptable to the neutral arbitrator,
he may be forced to compromise his own best judgment in order
to reach a decision. 2
6
Once the arbitration panel has made a ruling or order, either
party or the panel itself may seek an enforcement order in the
appropriate circuit court. 27 If either party willfully disobeys such
22 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.231 (1969).
23 Pennsylvania specifically provides for arbitration of grievance disputes. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 217.1 (1968). However, the cost of arbitration would in all likelihood
discourage the submission of the typical grievance dispute.
24 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.236 (1969).
25 Furthermore, even if good cause and substantial interest are proved to the satisfaction of
the panel, intervention is not necessarily permitted. The panel "may" grant leave to
intervene, permission being contingent upon agreement by two of the three arbi-
trators. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.236 (1969).
26 This problem is avoided in Ontario's statute which provides that, upon the request of
either party, "the appointment of a single arbitrator shall be made by the Attorney
General." The single arbitrator then hears and "determines the difference" and makes
a final and binding decision. The arbitrator will not be forced into a compromise that
he deems undesirable. REVISED STATUTES OF ONTARIO (R.S.O.) 1960, c. 298, s. 32,
subs. 2, re-enacted in 1963-1964. R.S.O. 1960, c. 145, s. 17, subs. 5, amended in
1963-1964. This problem will be avoided, however, if those appointed to the arbi-
tration panel by the parties adopt a conciliatory rather than an adversarial approach.
This was the hope of the sponsors of the Act. Interview with Theodore Schs, Chief
Counsel for the Michigan Firefighter's Association, October 15, 1969.27 See note II, supra.
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order as the court may issue, or encourages or offers resistance
thereto, by strike or otherwise, the court may fix a fine for
contempt at not more than $250 per day. 28 Whether this provision
ensures enforcement of the arbitrators' decision is not certain. On
the one hand, the union and the municipalities may be reluctant to
pay such a fine over an extended period of time. On the other
hand, where the parties to the dispute stand on materially dis-
parate financial footing, this pre-determined penalty can become
an effective weapon in the hands of the well-financed party. Since
one cannot be imprisoned for a violation of this Act,2 9 the $250
per day fine is the greatest penalty that can be assessed for
non-compliance with the panel's decision. Thus, if a well-financed
party thought the other might withdraw certain demands, it might
attempt to hold out, pay the fine, and alter the award by stipula-
tion, thus avoiding the panel's decision. Such a result might be
avoided if the courts were left free to assess a penalty com-
mensurate with the financial resources of the employer or union.
30
Although judicial review of arbitration panel decisions may be
generally undesirable because it eliminates the finality of those
decisions, it is nonetheless required by the state constitution.31
Moreover, such review is desirable as a check on the arbitration
panel's jurisdiction, and to ensure that the guidelines for decision
set out in the Act are not completely ignored.3
2
On the other hand, if judicial review were too easily attainable,
the panel's decision would lack substantial finality. In an attempt
to avoid excessive resort to judicial review, the opportunity for
the parties to select two of the arbitrators was provided. This
procedure enables the parties to draw on those professionals in
the field on whom they may confidently rely. In this way, the
sponsors of the Act hoped to ensure adherence to the panels'
28 
See note 12, supra.
29 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.246 (1969).
30 Other states have taken an approach similar in effect to that of Michigan. Pennsylvania,
for example, does not prescribe any punishment for violation of the arbitration
board's decision in disputes involving policemen and firemen. Rather, the board's
determination constitutes a mandate to the employer. If the board's decision is not
obeyed, either party can presumably obtain court enforcement of the order, although
the statute is not explicit on this point. Once the court issued an order requiring
compliance with the board's determination, refusal to obey the board's order could be
ruled contempt of court.
31 MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 28.
32 These standards are set out in text accompanying note 10 supra.
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decisions. Moreover, under Public Act 312, review is limited to
cases of fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or lack of any evidentiary
support. It can therefore be expected that judicial review of the
arbitration award will be rare, and that the finality of the award
will not be weakened.
33
If Michigan's statute follows the course set by similar statutes
in other states, it will face constitutional challenges. These chal-
lenges will probably be initiated by municipalities who do not
desire to submit to arbitration. Such attacks have generally been
based on the ground that the statutes are unconstitutional delega-
tions of legislative power to non-governmental agencies. It is
argued that these statutes do not provide sufficient standards
governing the exercise of the delegated power by the arbitration
panel. Notwithstanding such arguments, the Rhode Island and
Wyoming provisions, which are quite similar to Michigan's, have
survived constitutional challenge.3 4 Moreover, a Michigan circuit
court upheld compulsory arbitration for public employees in a
1967 decision.a 5 In all likelihood, Public Act 312 will be upheld
against such a challenge.
IV. Conclusion
With enactment of compulsory arbitration, Michigan policemen
and firemen need no longer rely solely on collective bargaining
and mediation to settle disputes with employers. The availability
of arbitration strengthens the unions' position vis-d-vis the em-
ployer despite the absence of the strike privilege. By allowing
either party in police and fire department disputes to initiate
compulsory arbitration, Michigan has given these groups a means
beyond collective bargaining and mediation by which to achieve
3s Interview, Theodore Sachs, supra note 26.34 City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Assn. 256 A.2d 206 (R.I. 1969). State
ex rel Fire Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968).
35 Local 953 and Council 55 v. School District of the City of Benton Harbor, Circuit
Court for the County of Berrien, No. C-6229(B), October 12, 1967, CIrcuit Judge
Chester J. Byrns. (Arbitration provision in a contract between a Michigan School
District and the union representing the District employees held binding and enfor-
ceable.)
(Vol. 3:1
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their goals.a 6 The statute should therefore make damaging and
potentially disastrous stoppages of essential services unlikely.
3 7
- William J. Rainey
36 It seems doubtful that compulsory binding arbitration could be expanded to cover other
public employees, at least in the near future. According to one source:
Implementation of this approach on a wider basis
would be difficult without substantial public support
as well as the support of the employing agencies
and the employee organization directly concerned,
and the latter may not be quickly forthcoming.
Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public
Employment Labor and Legislation: A Com-
parative Analysis, 67 MIcH. L. REV. 891, 916
(1969).
37 However, see note 17 supra.
